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RECENT DECISION
TAXATION; DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A GROUP ANNUITY
POLICY AND AN EMPLOYEES' TRUST.
N 1941 the petitioner, a manufacturing company, paid the sum
of $575,206.43 into a retirement annuity policy for its em-
ployees and contributed the sum of $1,000,000.00 to an employees'
trust. Held: Such payments constituted ordinary and necessary
business expenses and were deductible under section 23 (a) (1)
(A) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 This was the case of Lincoln
Electric Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 Tax
Court 1600, decided March 26, 1952.
This was the fifth time that this case had been before the
courts.
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the problems
litigated, the following outline provisions of the annuity policy
and the employees' trust should be noted.
Outline of the Annuity Policy.
Name: The Lincoln Electric Retirement Annuity Plan under
a group annuity contract with the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada.
Year effective: 1936.
Eligibility requirements: The minimum age for both male
and female is 15 years, the maximum, 60 years. One
year of service is also required.
Contributions:
(1) Employee-none.
(2) Employer-to be determined by the company at its
discretion, however with a limitation of $600,000.00
per year.
1 Internal Revenue Code Section 23 (a) (1) (A).
Trade or business. In general-All the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire
amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the
pursuit of a trade or business; and rental or other payments required to
be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of
the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is
not taking title or in which he has no equity.
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Beneftts:
(1) Formula-retirement benefits are based on age, serv-
ice and sex to be computed under tables in the
policy.
(2) Normal retirement age-upon reaching 60 years of
age the employee retires and the annuity contract
becomes vested.
(3) Death benefits-normally none, however there are
some exceptions.2
(4) Forfeitures-to be allocated among other employees
covered by the policy.
Miscellaneous: The policy also contained a provision that no
part of the forfeitures or interest shall ever revert back
to the Employer, but shall be used to pay future pre-
miums.
Outline of the Profit Sharing Trust.
Name: The Lincoln Electric Company Employees' Profit
Sharing Trust.
Trustee: The Cleveland Trust Company.
Year Effective: In December 1941, by resolution of the Board
of Directors of the Company.
Eligibility requirements: All who were regular employees
as of December 31, 1941 excluding salesmen, the com-
pany president, chairman of the board and the treasurer.
Contributions:
(1) Employee-none.
(2) Employer-a lump sum contribution of $1,000,000.00
was contributed by action of the company in De-
'The court (6 Tax Court) in commenting on the annuity plan stated: "In
the event the employee dies or his employment is terminated for any cause
other than disability, all his rights are forfeited except where the annuity
already accrued for that employee is equal to his then annual salary or
$3,500.00 whichever is less. In the latter case, the accrued annuity becomes
the property of the withdrawing employee and he has the right to exercise
all the options and privileges inherent therein, except the right to assign
any interest or benefit to which he may be entitled. The policy further
provides that, in the event of the severance from employment before retire-
ment age, "there shall become available on account of the contributions of
the Employer allocated to such employee * * * an amount equal to 90% of
the total of such contributions together with interest at the rate of three
and one-half per cent (3%%) per annum compounded annually, or the total
of such contributions, whichever shall be the greater."
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss2/8
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cember, 1941. There was no set formula for deter-
mining the contribution. No contributions were
made before or after the initial payment.
Benefits:
(1) Formula-proportion of the total fund represented
by the ratio of his total cash compensation in the
period January 6, 1941 to December 5, 1941, to the
total compensation of the beneficiaries.
(2) Duration-the fund is to vest in the participants at
the end of ten years.
Miscellaneous: The plan was to be administered by a com-
mittee composed of three members. The president of
the company was a member ex officio. The committee
was vested with wide powers, to which the Tax Court
took exception. 3 The plan provided that no distribution
was to be made to or for the benefit of any beneficiary
during the ten year period, except by the voluntary ac-
tion of the committee. It also provided that no part of
the corpus or income from the corpus could ever revert
back to the company.4
The taxpayer claimed the contribution as an expense on its
1941 corporation income tax return.5 An examination of the re-
turn by The Internal Revenue Agents Office resulted in the ex-
pense being disallowed. The taxpayer protested the findings and
petitioned the Tax Court for a hearing. The decision was pro-
mulgated January 11, 1946.6
'6 Tax Court 37, Promulgated January 11, 1946.
'It is interesting to note that in The Lincoln Electric Company Employees
Profit Sharing Trust; The Cleveland Trust Company, Trustee v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, a collateral issue was considered as to the
taxability of the trust. 14 Tax Court 598, Promulgated April 17, 1950. The
court held the trust was not an exempt trust within the purview of section
165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. This decision was appealed by the
petitioner and the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit held: "Un-
der Internal Revenue Act provided that trust forming part of a stock bonus,
pension or profit sharing plan of employer for the exclusive benefit of em-
ployees or their beneficiaries is exempt from taxation, income from irrevo-
cable trust to which established plan to share definite portion of employer's
profits with certain officers and employees by future distribution was exempt
from taxation." 190 F. 2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
'The taxpayer filed its 1941 Federal income tax return with the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the eighteenth district of Ohio, at Cleveland, Ohio.
'6 Tax Court 37 (1946).
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The respondent contended that such payments did not repre-
sent compensation, were not ordinary or necessary business ex-
penses and, in some instances, did not represent reasonable com-
pensation. The petitioner contended that the contributions were
properly deductible either (a) as compensation paid for per-
sonal service actually rendered, or (b) if not such compensation,
as an expense or (c) if not a deduction from gross income then
merely a cost of goods to be reflected in the computation of gross
income and that as to this respondent has no jurisdiction. The
court sustained the determination of the Commissioner. On
appeal the decision was reversed.7 The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the premiums
paid were ordinary and necessary expenses deductible under
section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code and re-
manded the case back to the Tax Court for a recomputation of
the deficiencies.
Upon the first remand to the Tax Court, the Commissioner
contended that since the Circuit Court had decided that the con-
tributions were ordinary and necessary business expenses, it was
within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to decide the question
of the reasonableness of the payments as compensation. The
company argued that no such issue was present, and all that
was necessary was a determination by the Tax Court of the
deficiencies, if any, with an allowance of such deduction to the
petitioner. The Tax Court held that it had no jurisdiction under
the mandate as contended by the Commissioner since the Sixth
Circuit Court directed that the deduction was allowable under
section 23 (a), and therefore it was improper to consider whether
or not they constituted compensation for personal services.
The Commissioner appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court
held8 that the remand restored to the Tax Court all the authority
it possessed when the case was first before it except that it was
required to conform to the ruling of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals on the question of law and again remanded the case to
determine reasonableness.
The present case was now before the court on the second
mandate from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The sole issue
that was decided was whether or not the amounts contributed
to the annuity contract and the profit sharing trust were reason-
'162 F. 2d 379 (6th Cir. 1947).
176 F. 2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949); cert. den., 338 U. S. 949 (1950).
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able. The Tax Court in complying with the mandate held that
the amounts were reasonable. Thus the company was entitled
to deduct the contributions as ordinary and necessary expenses
in carrying on its business under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
In view of the above decision it is interesting to note the com-
ment the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in deciding Robertson v. Steele's Mills, a case similar in
many respects.9 The court in referring to the Lincoln Electric
case stated: "The opinion of Circuit Judge Simons in the Lincoln
Electric case, 162 F. 2d at page 384, contains an eloquent enco-
mium of trusts created by employers for the benefit of employees.
With that encomium we heartily agree. But the federal taxability
of expenditures for these trusts does not depend upon their
beneficence. Congress has furnished other criteria as determina-
tive of taxability and these criteria we must follow and apply.
Whether the ethical and economic excellences of these trusts
should place them in a favored federal tax category is a problem
for Congress and not for the Courts."
The Court with reference to the Roberts Filter case, cited
infra, further stated: "Though the facts in the three cases are not
identical, we think these cases are so similar that the same result
should be reached in the instant case, in the Roberts Filter case
and the Lincoln Electric case. Judge Arnold recognized the
similarity between the Roberts Filter case and the Lincoln Elec-
tric case and, speaking for the Tax Court in the former case,
flatly refused to follow the opinion of Judge Simons, speaking
for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in the latter
case. We prefer the reasoning in the Roberts Filter case as con-
forming more closely to that economic reality which is often said
to be the very essence of tax legislation."
The case referred to in the above paragraph was Roberts
Filter Manufacturing Company, Petitioner v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.'0 The court in that case, in comparing it with
the Lincoln Electric case, stated: "The problem here is similar in
several respects. A fundamental principle of income tax law is
the annual accounting of profits and losses. A taxpayer may not
play good years against bad years by shifting income or expenses
'172 F. 2d 817, at 822 (4th Cir. 1949).
1010 Tax Court 26 (1948).
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from one year to another. To allow petitioner to take a deduction
of $40,000.00 for 1941 for an amount which is to be paid as com-
pensation to its employees in subsequent years would result in a
distortion of petitioner's net income for 1941. With all due
deference to the Circuit Court, we adhere to the views we ex-
pressed in our decision in the cited case and prefer to follow that
decision here."
The Roberts Filter case was appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sustained the Tax Court."
However it did attempt to distinguish the Roberts Filter case
from the Lincoln Electric case.
It should be noted that the Commissioner has not acquiesced
in the decision in the Lincoln Electric case.12
DANIEL R. MCCARTHY
"174 F. 2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1949).
"A similar issue was involved in Produce Reporter Company, 18 Tax Court
8, decided April 10, 1952. The company pointed out that neither 165 (a) nor
23 (p) makes any mention of a definite predetermined formula, and this re-
quirement is only contained in the commissioner's regulations. The Tax
Court found for the company, but without considering the validity of the
regulation.
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